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Abstract Political friendship is typically portrayed as a dyadic relationship. In this 
traditional model, friendship is conceived as a positive intersubjective experience of relation-
to-self and relation-to-other, assuming the reciprocity and equality characteristic of 
symmetrical relations of recognition. This essay explores an alternative, triadic model of 
political friendship suggested by the work of Hannah Arendt. Arendt makes the claim, at 
odds with most modern accounts, that “politics is not so much about human beings as it is 
about the world that comes into being between them and endures beyond them.” I suggest 
that the dyadic model of political friendship is incomplete; a more adequate paradigm would 
foreground triadic relations of interest, concern and care for the phenomenal world itself, 
conceived as the quasi-objective intermediary of human artifice. As a “public thing,” a shared 
world is a necessary condition for intersubjective friendship and therefore is deserving of a 




While the concept of friendship still remains on the margins of academic analyses of political 
life, the past two decades have witnessed a remarkable growth in this field of study.
1
 Not only 
has political friendship taken up a place as a serious and important alternative to dominant 
contractualist, rights-based legal and ethical frameworks, but there has also been a recent 
proliferation of analyses of the role and nature of friendship in domestic, international and 
global contexts. Intellectual historians, philosophers and political theorists have convincingly 
shown that political friendship deserves greater conceptual attention, and that it may 
contribute to rethinking “real world” social and political problems. Moreover, this same 
period has witnessed an increasing effort by social and political theorists to extend critical 
debates and insights focused on the concept of recognition. From interpersonal relationships 
of self and other, to multiculturalism, identity politics, new social movements, economic 
inequality, human development and global justice, theories of the ethics and politics of 
recognition have challenged mainstream liberal and communitarian accounts of political 
coexistence and the “normative grammar” of social life.2 Surprisingly, however, there has 
been little substantive cross-fertilization of the themes of political friendship and recognition. 
This is puzzling both because the phenomenon of friendship exhibits characteristics strongly 
correlated to the dynamics of mutual recognition, and because the concept of recognition 




 In this essay I seek to contribute to the project of building conceptual bridges between 
theories of political friendship and theories of recognition. In particular, I suggest that 
analyses of the relationality of both recognition and friendship have an important role to play 
in conceptualizing the “worldly” context of political friendship. Political friendship is 
typically portrayed as a dyadic relationship. In this model, friendship is conceived as a 
positive intersubjective experience of relation-to-self and relation-to-other, assuming the 
reciprocity and equality characteristic of symmetrical relations of recognition. I argue that 
this traditional understanding of political friendship reflects insufficiently upon the extent to 
which the dyadic model is incomplete. My understanding of political friendship on the 
contrary foregrounds triadic relations of interest, concern and care for the world itself, 
conceived as the common intermediary of human artifice. As a “public thing,” a shared world 
is a necessary condition for intersubjective friendship and therefore is deserving of a properly 
political mode of acknowledgement and friendship in its own right. 
 To demonstrate this claim I first outline the relational nature of friendship, typically 
conceived as a positive relation-to-self and relation-to-other experience that exhibits the 
dyadic structure of intersubjective recognition. This is followed by an exploration of the 
political or public relevance of friendship, highlighting the limits of its dyadic intersubjective 
focus. I argue that the dyadic understanding of political friendship has a tendency to neglect 
the common world whose quasi-objective existence serves as phenomenal intermediary 
between self and other. Following this, I elaborate on the need to make political friendship 
more “worldly” by fostering triadic interconnections between self, world and other. The final 
part of the essay proposes redescribing political friendship as “befriending the world,” which 
I suggest is a political acknowledgement of the mutuality rather than formal reciprocity of the 
self-world-other triad, and a performative manifestation of regard for the shared world in its 
own right. 
 
Friendship, Intersubjective Recognition and Relationality 
Friendship comes in many guises. Yet all kinds of friendship share in common that they are 
essentially social relationships. They are therefore reciprocal in character, formative of our 
identities, and constitutive of our everyday lives with others. For Aristotle, of course, 
friendship answers to the deep human need for community; “friendship [philia],” he tells us, 
“is the motive of social life.”3 He famously argues that there are three distinct species of 
friendship that correspond to three different kinds of lovable goods (phileta): friendship based 
on mutual advantage and utility, friendship based on the mutual pleasure derived from being 
in one another’s company, and friendship based on mutual appreciation of one another’s 
virtuous character. Only the last type of friendship is lasting, complete and “perfect,” because 
in this relationship friends wish for and pursue the good qua good for their friend’s own 
sake.
4
 The mutual appreciation of the qualities of excellence embodied in true friendship is 
premised on the mutual recognition of what the other is,
5
 and therefore on a reflexive 
acknowledgement that two persons see themselves in and through the eyes of the other. 
Aristotle apprehends in the relation of friendship a kind of mirror effect whereby, he says “all 
friendly feelings for others are extensions of a man’s feelings for himself.”6 Yet if it is true 
that “a friend is another self,”7 then the interactions of friendship also result in a certain 
interchange of identity, since the self must also be “another friend”; each friend arrives into 
self-realization through the internalized regard of the valued other. The friend must be 
“another” and not the “same” self because the defining feature of friendship is that it is a 
relationship.
8
 Self-othering, whereby one relates to another under the sign of a common good, 
is a principal mark of friendship.
9
 
 The emphasis on the dyadic “friend is another self” trope reverberates through the 
classical literature on friendship.
10
 Cicero, for instance, conceived of friendship as a type of 
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love for another “whose habits and character are congenial with our own.”11 The defining 
characteristic of the relationship of friendship is mutual goodwill, which is a motivational 
attitude that puts a premium on treating a friend with concern and respect equal to how one 
treats oneself.
12
 In this way, Cicero notes, “he who looks upon a true friend, looks, as it were, 
upon a sort of image of himself.”13 Similarly, Aquinas holds that the “fellowship of 
friendship” is essential to a happy life. Human friendship is required for the joint activities of 
good works and charity, which elevate friends closer to the divine in their love of God.
14
 
Aquinas thus frames friendship as a relationship of mutual benevolence, whereby friends are 
joined as two-in-one through their shared love of the good: “It should be said that friendship 
is not a virtue properly speaking, but something following on virtue. For because one is 
virtuous it follows that he will love those like himself.”15 Finally, both Montaigne and Kant 
follow closely the “friend is another self” tradition. In Montaigne’s view, the most perfect 
and complete friendship exemplifies a bond whereby each friend is to the other as the friend 
is to himself. Such a union reveals that the seemingly singular self is in fact doubled in the 
other. Writing of his friendship with Etienne de la Boétie, Montaigne opines: “If you press 
me to tell why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed, except by answering: Because 
it was he, because it was I.”16 In comparison, Kant insists that the affectionate bonds of 
friendship must be tempered by reason, lest they become so tightly drawn and dominating as 
to jeopardize the equal worth and autonomy of the other person. While friendship consists, 
therefore, of reciprocated self-revelation, trust and the desire to communicate openly, such 
disclosure must be “consistent with mutual respect” that acknowledges the other person as 
particular and irreplaceable. Only then can friendship assume a “moral” quality, as a 
relationship of reciprocal concern between equals.
17
 
 Further specific theoretical examples can be multiplied, but the general points are 
these: friendship, as the state or quality of two or more persons being friends, is a 
relationship; the nature of this relationship consists of “connective bonds between person and 
person”; such connective bonds manifest some type of mutual concern on the part of the self 
for the other; this mutual concern presumes a high degree of symmetry between those bound 
together by friendship; and the acknowledgement of symmetry is “connected to the 
recognition of value in self and others.”18 The bond of friendship entails reflexivity, insofar as 
entering into friendly relations with others requires a productive cognitive movement in the 
self from awareness of those others as distinct persons, to consideration of the circumstances 
of their encounter, to a series of judgements about character, compatibility and interests, to 
assuming a commitment of responsibility to others. Yet for all of this, the attachment of 
friendship is equally and profoundly affective: it elicits and draws upon feelings of concern 
and care, pleasure and joy, sympathy and intimacy, and even of desire and a deep need for the 
self to be drawn inexorably towards others. The phenomenon of friendship thus reveals that 
meaningful selfhood is a function of being implicated in relations to others with whom the 
self can both identify and differ. In this way, the relationality of friendship is contiguous with 
the intra- and intersubjective dynamics of the formation of self-consciousness that underpins 
the ethical-political imperative of recognition. 
 The basic contention here is that friendship should be construed as presupposing 
social recognition and, further, that friendship itself is a socially recognized practice—though 
not the only one—by which identity, understanding and status are constituted through our 
interactions with others. G. W. F. Hegel’s seminal writings establish the fundamental terms 
of the theme of recognition by calling attention to the nature of self-consciousness. His great 
innovation is to show that consciousness is always consciousness of something other than 
itself—both inanimate objects and animate others. As used by moral and political 
philosophers and social theorists who draw more or less systematically on Hegel, the term 
“recognition” offers the possibility of thinking about individuals and community in deeply 
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relational terms, and of grasping the psychological, social and political effects on persons and 
groups who suffer from a lack of recognition. While accounts of recognition and its ethico-
political import differ,
19
 it is possible to isolate several key (though not exhaustive) attributes 
of the substance of intersubjective recognition that buttress its pertinence to friendship, both 
personal and political. 
 First, it is widely agreed that, because individuals exist in and through their relations 
with others, recognition theory relies on a relational ontology. This means, on the one hand, 
that individuals are not monadic, sovereign selves but are formed by and come to define 
themselves through their relations with others and, on the other hand, that individuality and 
social ethics are not isolated from one another but instead human personhood is contextually 
sustained by ethical relationships; the self is always cultivated as a morally relevant entity 
within an array of different social relations. Hegel, for instance, insists that recognition 
mediates between the particular (private individuals) and the universal (social ethics), thereby 
articulating the reflexivity of self to other within successive and increasingly complex forms 
of socialization from the family to the state. In making this argument, he claims that human 
self-consciousness will not properly develop in the absence of recognition by others.
20
 Such 
recognition ideally manifests itself within three central spheres of ethical life (Sittlichkeit): in 
the family, in civil society, and in the state.
21
 The merit of Hegel’s phenomenology of 
recognition, when it comes to friendship, is his insight that ethical relationships may be 
formed on the basis of a reciprocity that reconciles the universal and the particular in a 
“moral totality” of complementarily distinct entities: through friendship, self and other exist 
as a dynamic relationship of mutual recognition of similarity and difference, that is, of 
identity and differentiation. In “friendship and love,” Hegel says, “we are not inherently one-
sided; we restrict ourselves gladly in relating ourselves to another, but in this restriction know 
ourselves as ourselves.”22 
 The second apposite feature of intersubjective recognition concerns interdependency. 
Viewed through the lens of relationality, self and other are seen as dependent on one another, 
and perform a function for each other in providing mutual care, nurturance, assistance, love, 
friendship and of course recognition.
23
 A self is constituted through relations of 
interdependency that both enable and constrain its possibilities of meaningful personhood in a 
variety of ways. As Axel Honneth has argued, love—”whether between friends, lovers, or 
parent and child”—is a form of recognition that physically sustains and emotionally supports 
the growth and development of persons in need.
24
 Bryan Turner has described human 
interdependency as a matrix of four conditions: the vulnerability of human beings as 
embodied agents, the dependency of humans on others for survival, the general reciprocity or 
interconnectedness of social life, and the precariousness of socio-political institutions.
25
 
Turner argues that this “vulnerability of our everyday world” makes social institutions 
(familial, cultural, legal, and political) and social practices such as friendship necessary in 
order to provide stability, security and support.
26
 A protective, supportive space for social 
interaction is vital to cultivating the chains of interdependence through which the integrity, 
identity and agency of persons can be acquired in a process of reciprocal recognition. 
Interdependency, then, is not a weakness but, as Charles Taylor says,
27
 a “vital human need” 
for others to value, care for, take an interest in, and befriend us not only for what we are—
parent, child, sibling, lover, colleague, neighbour—but for who we are. We might say that the 
point of recognition is to acknowledge certain kinds of social interdependencies and that the 
point of friendship is to care for and enhance those interdependencies. Friendship thus makes 
us more, rather than less, recognizable when coupled with fulfilling interdependence. 
 A third and final feature that I will add here is that recognition is also a deeply 
important human need because it is so closely intertwined with questions of identity and our 
sense of place in the world. While the need for recognition is universal, it is a performative 
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process binding both recognized and recognizers with reference to particular socio-historical 
contexts. Locating recognition in the intersubjective realm of ethical life, where the self is 
meant to assume the character and dispositions of a concretely situated being for whom 
reciprocity and accountability facilitate the self-realization of one’s freedom in relation to 
others and a system of shared social institutions, makes questions concerning the giving and 
receiving of recognition a matter of hermeneutical-existential import. Thus one can 
conceptualize recognition in terms of meaning, interpretation and understanding. The task of 
understanding self and other rests upon basic forms of symbolic representation by which we 
come to know and appreciate ourselves and others, through acknowledging particular 
histories, identities and relationships. Investigating and interrogating the views held by 
ourselves and others facilitates our normative orientations, enlarges our perspectives on the 
world, and can lead to opportunities for acquiring as well as questioning shared meanings. 
Taylor observes that human identity and agency is fundamentally dialogical in character, 
meaning both that mutual understanding is predicated on intersubjective dialogue, and that 
the practice of recognition consists, in large part, of the self’s dialogical exchanges with 
others.
28
 In this way, too, dialogical recognition lies at the heart of friendship—which relies 
on open, hospitable yet critical communication more than, perhaps, any other attribute. 
Indeed, friendship may rightly be considered the highest expressive form of mutual 
recognition: the friend is “another self” embodied in the role of meaningful interlocutor 




Political Friendship and the Limits of Recognition: The Role of World 
The intersection of friendship and politics generates what appears to be a dichotomous 
choice: A political approach would view friendship as an eminently public act of partnership, 
and insist that political community is necessarily sustained by and even completed in the 
bonds of friendship. By contrast, an apolitical approach would regard friendship as most 
attractive when restricted to the personal sphere, and contend that practical political life 
unavoidably taints the refuge of friendship. In reality, of course, friendship evades such a 
strict dichotomy. This does not mean, then, that proponents of the political approach must 
regard it as the sole form of friendship, exclusive of private friendships. Neither must they 
ignore the hazards attendant upon public life. Friendship can be fulfilling in both its private 
and public forms, and may be fluidly interlinked in ordinary practice. But as a matter of 
principle, the political approach will not concede an inherently negative opposition between 
friendship and politics and indeed will endorse, in some way or another, the belief that there 
is a positive symmetry between the two. The challenge is to develop a notion of friendship 
that welcomes personal relationships sheltered from the demands of public affairs, without 
giving up on the critical value of a shared conception of the political as a place where a 
distinctive type of friendship can (and perhaps ought to) be experienced. 
 Recognition theory offers a path by which to “bridge” the political and apolitical 
perspectives on friendship, because of its insistence on the relational quality of social 
interaction. To treat friendship as either a political or an apolitical phenomenon is to assume 
that they are naturally opposed kinds, the essence of which is separable from social 
interaction. Yet it is untenable to think that social phenomena—whether of a more personal 
or a more political kind—can exist independent of relations between persons. Friendship only 
exists as a relationship between social entities, whether referring to individuals, citizens, 
communities, groups or even states.
30
 In other words, the relation of friendship can never 
designate something separable from the particular friends that it conjoins, and still less can it 
connote a mode of interaction that only truly pertains to a single level of reality. The lived 
experience of friendship belies any such formal categorization. No doubt there are particular 
ways of tending to friendships that are taken to be more personal or more political in 
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character, with different sets of expectations and varying sorts of sensibilities. Yet whether 
within the wider political community or the closer circle of personal friends, friendship is a 
reflexive-affective exercise that presumes a receptivity towards others. What is most central 
to the practice of friendship, therefore, is that prospective friends approach one another 
through an encounter whereby the self engages with, and extends recognition to, the other. 
Recognition in general entails more than merely perceiving something; it entails an 
acknowledgement of what is distinctive in the object of perception. Indeed, it is precisely the 
quality and tenor of a certain type of affirmative recognition that confers a distinctive status 
on friendship compared to other modalities of social recognition. Thus the experience of 
friendship, of whatever kind, can only be gained through the experience of recognition. 
Friendship, both personal and political, seems to be both initiated and continually guided by 
an appreciation for the needs, attributes, abilities and accomplishments of others which attract 
an individual’s attention, prompting reflection, recognition and caring regard for the 
relationship itself. 
 This brings us to the following question: What is the object of recognition and care in 
the specific relationship of political friendship? Aristotle points us in the right direction when 
he stresses that political friendship (philia politike) has two facets. The first consists of the 
unique type of relationship between fellow citizens in the polis, where the focus is on the 
mutual benefits gained by pursuing civic association and cooperation; while the second 
consists of the citizens’ relationship to the polis itself, where the focus is on preserving and 
enhancing the public space that makes political relations possible.
31
 All friendships may be 
useful and pleasurable, even those based on goodness, but only political friendship holds out 
the additional advantage of looking after the stability and reliability of a durable political 
community within which a flourishing human life may be nurtured and sustained. The 
conception of friendship that intimates some role for cultivating the public realm, or at least 
the common good, as an element of being with others politically is shared by a number of 
other commentators as well. J. G. A. Pocock, for example, describes his interpretation of the 
civic republican tradition in a manner that portrays citizens as custodians of the public realm 
and sees this as virtuous action akin to political friendship.
32
 Adopting a somewhat different, 
and for my purposes, more promising trajectory, Graham Smith gives a central role to a 
“shared world of order and value” that is “held together and animated by the bonds” of 
political friendship “between person and person.”33 
 At this point, however, we come up against a conceptual limitation that transects 
contemporary theories of political friendship and recognition. The limitation is that both 
theoretical approaches fail to give due independent weight to the concept and place of 
“world” in the friendship-recognition nexus. Despite the notion that, according to Aristotle, 
friends must have something “in common,”34 and the stress he placed on maintaining the 
norms, laws and institutions making up a political community as integral to the utility of 
political friendship, theorists of political friendship have paid the phenomenon of a common 
world little if any attention. I suspect there are two reasons for this. First, as many 
commentators have noted, in the modern era personal and private forms of friendship are 
considered to be admirable, while the association of friendship with the political is regarded 
with suspicion, if not entirely with disdain.
35
 Second, inasmuch as friendship has been widely 
divorced from the political, we can presuppose a corresponding dissociation between 
friendship and the public space within which, and on the basis of which, political discourse 
and action occurs. What then constitutes the relational space upon which the political is 
dependent for its manifestation and enactment—a tacit yet not explicitly theorized concern 
for Aristotle—is no longer a question that immediately springs to mind. What I want to 
suggest, however, is that the “worldliness” of the political is precisely what is shared in 
common when focusing on friendship in the political sense. To flesh out this claim, it is 
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necessary to shift our attention from the now commonplace account of friendship, and the 
mode of intersubjective recognition that informs it based on the self-other dyad,
36
 to an 
account based instead on the self-world-other triad. If, politically, friends must have 
something in common, then properly speaking that “something” belongs to neither of them as 
individual persons but rather exists as a third element in the relationship between them. That 
third element shared in common is best understood as “world.” 
 Hannah Arendt is the thinker perhaps best suited both to recovering the role of the 
world for political friendship, and to conceiving the complex interrelations between self, 
other and world in terms of recognition. Friendship is a recurring theme in Arendt’s writings 
and her thinking about the political.
37
 The political, on Arendt’s view, refers both to the freely 
initiated actions and unconstrained deliberations that individuals undertake with a plurality of 
others, and to the public space needed for political actions and speech to occur and to be 
witnessed.
38
 Important, too, is the following point: “Action without a name, a ‘who’ attached 
to it, is meaningless.”39 Action, for Arendt, is one of the principal ways that individuals 
become persons with recognizable identities, by disclosing or revealing who rather than what 
they are by what they do and say. Yet words and deeds can only be exercised meaningfully 
within relationships of mutual recognition, that is, when they are seen, heard and 
acknowledged by others. Crucially, then, personhood or personal identity is not strictly 
speaking an inherent or private quality. It is a particular moral and political status that we 
mutually guarantee to one another through recognition in a public realm characterized by the 
ontological condition of plurality.
40
 Arendt thus regards identity as a feature of 
intersubjective recognition that arises through human togetherness located, as the most 
distinctive feature of properly human life, in the realm of the political.  
 Although Arendt does not believe that friendship is intrinsically political, she does 
consider it to be one of the most significant forms of human association that can foster the 
relationality, interdependence and dialogical recognition required for jointly undertaken 
words and deeds, and which confers meaning on those political actions. Arendt was 
convinced, for instance, that the type of open dialogue and critical deliberative exchange that 
occurs most fruitfully between persons who regard each other as friends, could be seen to 
exemplify the process of politically “equalizing” people who are, naturally, “different and 
unequal.”41 This is because citizens, considered as political friends, “can understand the truth 
inherent in the other’s opinion.” Understanding “the greatest possible number and varieties of 
realities” as these appear to others, without asserting a privileged claim to an absolute truth 
that would trump all other opinions (doxai) is, Arendt insists, “the political kind of insight par 
excellence.”42 Political friendship so conceived, as distinguished from the intimacy of erotic 
love and the bonds of fraternal kinship, holds that “only the constant interchange of talk” can 
unite the otherwise disparate citizens of a polity into a partnership of peers. The political 
importance of friendship is manifest, then, in “the humanness peculiar to it,”43 that is, in the 
willingness to be drawn towards others in a way that confers on each the reciprocal status of 
equal interlocutor in a ceaseless discussion concerned with the world shared in common. 
Here we hit upon the crucial and innovative insight of Arendt’s understanding of the political 
relevance of friendship. Whereas political friendship and its accompanying process of 
recognition are typically treated as centring on discussion about and concern for each of the 
persons as citizens, Arendt wants to shift our gaze from the viewpoint of the citizen to the 
viewpoint of the polity itself or, more accurately, to the world which lays between them. “By 
talking about what is between them,” Arendt explains, “it becomes ever more common to 
them. . . [and] begins to constitute a little world of its own which is shared in friendship.”44 In 
short, self, other and world in all their relationality, interdependence and revelatory 




 Arendt likely would agree that most theorists have been too eager to leave the 
“common” world for a higher realm of “perfect” friendship untainted by plurality and the 
arena of politics. In order to turn friendship back towards the plane of the political in 
Arendtian terms and raise awareness of its “worldliness,” I will briefly flesh out the concept 
of world and its role in the frequently overlooked symbiotic relationships of the self-world-
other triad. The reason Arendt is attuned to the political significance of world when most 
modern theorists are not is, as noted above, her interpretation of the political as exceeding or 
standing beside the self-other dyad. In Arendt’s words: “Strictly speaking, politics is not so 
much about human beings as it is about the world that comes into being between them and 
endures beyond them.”45 What then is this world and why does Arendt imbue it with such 
magnitude? 
 Arendt expounds a concept of “world,” formulated as a substantive noun, inspired by 
existential-phenomenology. In doing so, she expands on the post-Hegelian paradigm of 
recognition by showing that intersubjective modes of socio-political recognition are 
dependent upon or mediated by quasi-objective “milieus” possessing distinctive ontological 
and relational qualities. The trio of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty are perhaps the most commonly known figures at the core of the 
phenomenological tradition who present explicit conceptions of world. For Husserl, “world” 
refers to what is “pregiven” in the perceptual circuit of intentional consciousness to meaning; 
consciousness is always “world-consciousness,” in the sense that the apprehension of objects 
as they appear in experience is synonymous with the apprehension of meaning.
46
 The subject 
is embedded in an intersubjective “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt) of historically and culturally 
preconstituted meanings, which serves as an abiding “horizon” for all knowledge, 
interpretation and action.
47
 Consequently, the lifeworld is a “third dimension” that makes 
common experience and its historical transmission possible.
48
 Heidegger, in contrast, 
distances his own understanding of world from the investigation of consciousness and 
situates it instead in relation to the question of Being. He insists that “self and the world 
belong together. . . not two beings, like subject and object,” but “the unity of Being-in-the-
world.”49 Human being (or Dasein), “thrown” temporally into the world prior to any subject-
object bifurcation, “primordially” encounters the world as a totality of “equipment” and 
conditions for practical engagement. Yet the intimacy that characterizes the coupling of 
“being-in-the-world,” disclosed through language, also engenders the horizon of all possible 
meaning and action and therefore of taking care (Sorge) of the world.
50
 Merleau-Ponty 
further develops these positions in order to go beyond the (corporeal) subject-object and self-
other correlates by showing that they exist in and through their interpenetration with world as 
a phenomenal field of dynamic relations.
51
 Ontologically, world is neither objective nor 
subjective but instead a “third dimension” that inexhaustibly unfolds between individuals 
(and all collective associations) as the necessary ground of intersubjective interaction.
52
 In his 
late work, Merleau-Ponty refers to the third dimension as the “flesh” or connective tissue of a 
sensible world that intertwines the actual and the virtual, and through which all persons take 
on a recognizable, lived reality.
53
 
 These phenomenological approaches to the ontology of world serve as conceptual 
underpinnings that support, yet generally remain implicit within Arendt’s more politically-
inclined interpretation. What Arendt shares with these approaches is a determination to 
situate the phenomenal reality of human coexistence—and even more specifically, for 
Arendt, of political coexistence—within a shared, historical world of experience. As with 
other existential-phenomenological theorists who have tended to think of world as a “field” 
or “centre of action,” Arendt talks about world as a “space of appearance” that is public by 
definition. Her conception of world leads her to reject thinking of political interaction in 
merely dyadic terms, since political subjects relate directly to a world as a third term as well 
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as to other political subjects, and which can be seen through several interwoven conceptual 
distinctions. The first is that world is a composition of human artifice having a quasi-
objective existence, an image that resonates strongly with the classical notion of the “public 
thing” (res publica). “Worldliness” characterizes the practical activities that build and shape 
the objective conditions, as distinguished from the natural environment, in which humans 
live—through instrumental praxes such as labour and work, which produce objects for 
consumption as well as endow the social structure with relative durability and stability, but 
also through the initiation of freely undertaken action that begins something new whose 
outcome is uncertain and unpredictable. In this way, cultural, economic, aesthetic, 
technological, and educational goods are invented that confer relative durability and stability 
on the social fabric, and associative practices and institutions based on mutual respect and 
equality are created that cultivate opportunities for collective interaction and foster diverse 
opinions about the character of public coexistence.
54
 While all three activities are 
interdependent, it is through joint action that a world acquires properly human significance 
and reality since it manifests a public, and paradigmatically political, aspect of togetherness 
that no other activity can give it. Hence worlds are always already meaningful because 
meaning is invested in and results from the world-building practices of individuals and 
communities, even though worlds themselves do not reduce to individuals and communities. 
 The second distinction concerns the relationship between plurality, recognition and 
identity. Arendt proposes that a world as space of appearance is pluralist in the dual sense 
that all phenomena appear through the plurality of perspectives that human beings take on a 
world, and that human beings appear to one another as a plurality of worldly, situated 
beings.
55
 Plurality is indispensable to the reality of a world because “the reality of the public 
realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which 
the common world presents itself.”56 Similarly, identity is intertwined with the manner in 
which we reveal the distinctiveness or uniqueness of “who” we are through the exchange of 
words and deeds with and amongst others in a shared world.
57
 A world is “where I appear to 
others as others appear to me,”58 Arendt says, and in so doing we become recognizable; put 
differently, the achievement of identity and the ability to appear before others via the milieu 
of a quasi-objective world are co-extensive.
59
 Identity, then, is immanent to worldly relations 
as the medium for the publically acknowledged aspects of one’s being-in-the-world-with 
others. 
 Finally, since worlds exist neither inside individuals inherently, nor outside of them 
transcendently, but rather between or among them as a kind of historical ensemble of human 
artifice, then the characteristic of relationality assumes the form of a disjunctive synthesis.
60
 
Instead of assuming a direct correspondence between subject and subject, self and other, 
Arendt maintains a worldly circuit between them must be established if their relations and 
interactions are to have political significance. Arendt famously appeals to the figure of a table 
to portray a world’s role as disjunctive synthesis: “To live together in the world,” she writes, 
“means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table 
is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and 
separates men at the same time.”61 Inasmuch as it manifests publicly and can be perceived 
and talked about by all from the myriad perspectives taken upon its appearance, a world 
serves as an “in-between” that both connects together and differentiates plural persons. As an 
intermediary third dimension that arises between plural persons (inter-est), a world serves as 
a kind of phenomenal milieu in which people become “equalized” through reciprocal 
recognition of their equal status as interlocutors appearing together publicly. Yet a worldly 
intermediary also separates and differentiates, since too much intimacy or closeness destroys 





 A world, then, is an intermediary third dimension that is irreducible to the persons 
who relate through and to it. We can understand a world, in political terms, as a precondition 
for interpersonal recognition including friendships. It is the site, as it were, where political 
friendship is situated. World-building establishes a meaningful public context for recognition, 
and persons depend upon the existence of an enduring common world, one that is shared 
between them and which renders them visible to others. By treating world as having the same 
ontological status as self and other, existing as a definite and historically specific ensemble of 
relations between political agents, we place recognition within a triadic schema of 
interworldly interdependencies. Recognition is distinguished not only by reciprocity between 
plural persons but by the presence of an acknowledged common world around which they are 
constituted. Consequently the dynamic of recognition is decidedly more complicated than 
dyadic theories indicate, because it entails a move away from the self-other duality towards a 
third shared object of concern that serves as a site of political coexistence. What is most 
pertinent for present purposes is that political friendship can then be seen from this position 
to express being-in-the-world-with-others afresh, as encompassing an interest in others that 
must be conjoined to an interest in world. 
 
Befriending the World: A Different Relationship of Recognition 
What does it mean to acknowledge the third dimension of world as a necessary condition of 
the political? My goal here is to make a case for the practice of acknowledging the status of 
world as an integral component of political friendship: through affirmation of its ontological 
uniqueness, appreciation of its complexity and fragility, and interest in its nurturance and 
well-being. I refer to this multifaceted practice of acknowledgement as “befriending the 
world.” The ultimate concern of this form of friendship is for what kind of world (or worlds) 
humans want to sustain, protect and experience as the milieu of their political coexistence and 
shared reality. If we understand world as a phenomenal space of appearance that is relational 
by nature, manifested through the ongoing coming together of plural persons in speech and 
action, then political friendship can be taken to mean a form of acknowledgement of persons 
as citizens as well as of the common public-political space between them. From the point of 
view of recognition theory, such acknowledgment can be translated as emerging from shared 
political engagements over the question of which particular worlds people want to be 
included in, which necessarily appeals to the existence of others seeking recognition and 
friendship. The question is compelling because not all worlds are conducive to public modes 
of friendship premised on recognition of plurality. A triadic conception of political friendship 
therefore does the work of intersubjective recognition but simultaneously looks to 
acknowledge the space of appearance in its own right; such friendship is deeply political 
when it becomes world-affirming, world-engendering and world-preserving. 
 What then is the type of bonding that exemplifies befriending the world? Given the 
nature of world as a quasi-objective common medium around which diverse people associate, 
and which is a phenomenal intermediary insofar as it lies relationally between people rather 
than substantively within them, a distinctive type of relationship of regard is forged between 
persons and world. Typically the bond of friendship is expressed in the language of 
reciprocity, which is a way of positively recognizing people’s moral standing and agency. 
Reciprocity has been given a broad role in traditions of political friendship. Aristotle, for 
instance, holds that proper friendship entails reciprocated goodwill, while friendship in 
Kant’s sense requires reciprocity of respect. When we have a relationship of friendship with 
others, we share with them a variety of thoughts, experiences, attitudes, values, dispositions 
and benefits. Yet reciprocity involves sharing not merely as the exchange of instrumental 
purposes or reasons, which otherwise leave people separate in their self-interestedness, but 
includes sharing something acknowledged as estimable embedded within or existing between 
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them as such: that which is joint or shared in common. What self and other share or 
reciprocate in political friendship is not literally a self-centred inner essence, but the common 
space of shared appearance and action that is external to and between them. In dyadic terms, 
political friendship means people doing things they believe will promote each other’s good, 
for the sake of self and other. In triadic terms, it means sharing an interest in doing things that 
promote the good or well-being of the world, for the sake of the world as well as for the sake 
of self and other. There is no necessary path from dyadic interpersonal political friendship to 
triadic interworldly political friendship. But the notion of befriending the world aims to foster 
such a path, even if that route may seem indirect or uncertain. One promising approach to 
clearing that path is to recognize that the analogue of reciprocity, when viewed through the 
quasi-objective lens of world, is mutuality. 
 In his discussion of “complete” friendship bound by the shared pursuit of excellence, 
Aristotle suggests that such friendship is premised on the virtue of generosity and the 
“opportunity for beneficence,” that is, for the practice of proper gift-giving as a kind of 
“mutual friendliness.”63 The act of giving well both solidifies the bonds of friendship and 
makes the act itself a kind of gift that is shared in such a way that it provides what the other 
cannot: the mutuality of gift-giving sustains and maintains the relationship of togetherness.
64
 
Without regularly reaffirming and repeating such generosity and giving, the relationship 
would wither. Claims about mutuality and generosity in friendship are mirrored by similar 
claims about amicable or “peaceful” modes of recognition that cannot be said to “belong” 
wholly to self or other. Paul Ricoeur, in his analysis of the polysemic character of the concept 
of recognition, suggests that the desire for recognition sheds light on the presence of not 
merely a human predisposition to sociability but further on a moral motivation to philia (as 
well as eros and agape).
65
 Philia does not necessarily appeal to the calculation and 
equivalence demanded by a “fair trade” (as in a contractual relationship), Ricoeur proposes, 
but instead embraces the practice of giving without expecting anything in return, even though 
in friendships generosity will be mutual and thus freely returned in some fashion. The 
experience of philia discloses a form of recognition as gift-giving that shifts away from 
formal reciprocity and towards informal mutuality. Friends are simultaneously givers and 
receivers to each other. Where formal reciprocity implies that equality is tied to the 
expectation of an equivalent exchange, mutuality is the expression of a double generosity: 
that of the initial giver, who “neither requires nor expects a gift in return,” and that of the 
initial recipient, who nonetheless returns the gesture voluntarily yet also, paradoxically, 
obligatorily.
66
 Yet the source of this obligation is a sense of gratitude rather than entitlement. 
Here recognition becomes an acknowledgement and affirmation of what is shared between 
self and other—and thus of the common ground, though contingent and plural, which is 
mutually established and cared for together. Consequently, Ricoeur’s argument raises a 
crucial point about recognition, whether interpersonal or interworldly; namely, it exhorts us 
to entertain the notion that the acknowledgment of the worth of others inherent to philia, even 
though it comes without a price, must be freely given in return. 
 Returning to philia politike as befriending the world, mutuality is an apt way to 
characterize the ties that self-world-other have with one another. Although a world does not 
reciprocate in the way typically attributed to human agency, it does exist within a circuit of 
mutual conditioning and interdependence—that is, of outward-looking giving and receiving. 
Arendt describes this relation of mutual influence between worlds and human beings when 
she writes the “things that owe their existence exclusively to men nonetheless constantly 
condition their human makers.”67 The connection between self-world-other, in other words, is 
a three-sided phenomenon and its ontological and existential core is the public web of 
relationships that provides a context within which individuals and groups can sustainably 
access mutual political recognition and civic acquaintance. People and worlds complement 
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one another and need each other for mutual support: just as sharing between people is a 
prerequisite for world-building, sharing between people and a world is a prerequisite for 
political coexistence and friendship. Worlds offer a collective abode for otherwise disparate 
individuals to encounter and connect with one another. The upshot of the discussion here is 
that a world enables us to exist and flourish not merely as human beings but as political 
beings. A world constitutes us as political beings and we in turn constitute, in part at least, a 
world as a shared public space. 
 Placing world at the centre of political friendship likewise highlights that the world is 
vulnerable to loss and even obliteration. Because world is synonymous with human artifice it 
does not possess a natural permanence, and worlds can be ruined through power 
asymmetries, structural injustices and misrecognition including racism, sexism, poverty, 
domination, terror and genocide. A world may also be destabilized or diminished by neglect, 
such as when people withdraw from the political realm into predominantly private 
relationships or limit their interchange to contexts of consumerism. We cannot “do” political 
friendship in isolation since it relies upon what happens and lies between mutually implicated 
people. Consisting of a mix of both inherited and novel tangible and intangible elements—
objects, customs, languages, concepts, institutions, memories, practices, experiences, habits, 
beliefs, symbols, narratives and traditions—worlds accumulate a density over time and are 
remade only through various modes of socio-historical transmission and inheritance.
68
 A 
world is the collective repository of a past, the meaningful condition of a present and the 
potential expression of a future. Indeed, if a world is to retain the quality of public space then 
it must, Arendt says, “survive the coming and going of the generations.”69 Yet the ability to 
associate and appear together with others presupposes there being either a common world 
already in place or conditions favourable to accessing and stimulating proto-worldly public 
interactions. From such fragile triadic entanglements a shared world has to be continually 
cultivated without assurance that there is an absolutely certain basis for its continuation. Self-
world-other either flourish together or deteriorate together. 
 With respect to the mutuality between self, world and other, my contention is that 
befriending the world means, in different ways and to various degrees, assuming a public 
disposition of companionability towards the world and all that it offers by way of providing 
the necessary conditions for becoming human with others. To befriend the world is to be 
attentive to it: to give back to it, to cultivate its growth and development, to promote its well-
being or flourishing, which in turn opens up the possibility of enhanced experience, of 
growing and flourishing interpersonally and politically.
70
 Since it would be imprudent to 
assert prescriptively what sorts of practices “count” as befriending the world, a few 
illustrative examples are merely sketched here. Given that the world, in its mediating role as 
common, is what grounds joint speech and action, then the scale and scope of dialogue and 
participation should, for instance, be as inclusive as possible. It is insufficient to appeal to any 
sort of natural sociability to ensure that people are able to speak and act together, as this 
would circumvent the indispensable world-formative process of political recognition. Thus 
the mutual dialogue, disputation of competing opinions, movement of agreement and 
disagreement, and amicable persuasion and dissuasion that is characteristic of political 
friendship must be underpinned by a refusal to exclude others from claiming a recognized 
place at the world’s table and thus from being seen and heard by others—for enlarging the 
diversity of perspectives on a world simultaneously amplifies the “fund” of worldliness that 
can be shared in common. 
 Of course, if political life is premised on plurality, then politics presupposes the 
possibility of disagreement. Similarly, matters of agreement and disagreement, inclusion and 
exclusion, expose the reality that difference in the public world may give rise to conflict and 
enmity. One of Carl Schmitt’s insights was to demonstrate how political encounters with 
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others—or “strangers” and “aliens”—in extraordinary situations juxtaposes a deeply 
existential struggle of “friends” against their “enemies”. The condition of possibility for the 
question “Who is the friend?” must be, Schmitt believes, the contraposed question, “Who is 
the enemy?” Put simply, the key point for Schmitt is that political friends (or non-enemies) 
need political enemies, and the political organs of the state are constituted on the basis of a 
presumed relationship of mutual opposition.
71
 Arendt certainly agrees that the political must 
leave room for debate, contention and dissent, and it would be naïve to underplay the 
potential for conflict since it is precisely the plurality of perspectives, voices and opinions 
that galvanize debate and participation. Moreover, Arendt thought that friendship is not 
antithetical to disagreement and she believed that the centrality of dispute to friendship had 
become lost in modern thought.
72
 Dispute, disagreement and even anger are still ways that 
friends share their opinions with each other and live together. A greater focus on the 
relational condition of political friendship thus reveals a deeper point, namely, that plural 
persons are not simply thrown back upon themselves as either friend or enemy simpliciter but 
rather upon the context of a mediating world. Even the friend-enemy distinction, in other 
words, presupposes some degree of worldliness that renders such a distinction intelligible. If 
that is the case, then the rigid binary of friend and enemy, which fixates on the mutually 
exclusive opposition of either identity or difference, can be offset by the mutually inclusive 
triad of self, world and other, in which both identity and difference find a common home. 
Placing world at the centre of our perspective on political friendship does not avert the 
possibilities for conflict that the contestable and equivocal character of public discussion and 
action may exacerbate, but it does unsettle an unnecessarily restrictive binary approach that 
itself minimizes the ways that worlds can be built and shared between plural people without a 
priori recourse to the designation of enemies. Indeed, even those who are “less than friends” 
at any given time may exist together in a productive relationship animated by concern for a 
common world—think of the “friendly rivalries” of sporting adversaries, for instance—and 
whose mutual recognition and respect may evolve into friendship because of or through that 
worldly intermediary. 
 The more that world-constituting action and speech around matters of shared political 
concern occurs, the more permanence and reality a world as in-between attains. The freedom 
to associate, to seek asylum or hospitality, and even to engage in civil disobedience are all 
aspects of befriending the world inasmuch as they presuppose a desire to share the world with 
others in all of their diversity. Such engagements in the worldly in-between also buttress 
public recognition of the human condition of plurality, from which the space of appearance 
arises, by acknowledging the complementary irreducibility of the common world and the 
individuals who reside there. Similarly, practices of democratic participation, civic 
association, solidaristic collaboration, activist campaigning, cooperative governance and 
public decision-making are powerful ways of augmenting world and its bonding capacity, 
whenever they are undertaken specifically for the sake of a world in which plurality is 
possible. Other befriending practices may be oriented around building up the tangible, 
physical dimensions of a common world, such as public institutional sites for politics and 
collective fora such as museums, schools, parks, and even sporting venues. Still other 
activities may contribute to the formation of the intangible, symbolic dimensions of world, 
including literature, poetry and narrative, musical performances, public works of art, 
municipal ceremonies, public holidays, speeches, and even legislative processes. Any 
collective exercise performed for the purpose of creating and maintaining a common public 
context for humans to come together in their plurality, yet which stands outside of and 
between self and other, may be indicative of befriending the world. Building new worldly 
contexts, or preserving and enhancing established ones, may also be done on a multitude of 





 provided they illuminate rather than obscure plurality. 
What is of paramount importance is maintaining the continuity of ongoing befriending 
practices, based on a sense of gratitude for the durable presence of a world and all that it 
gives through the manifold ties of mutuality. Continuity helps sustain both the unique 
relationality of world as a binding element and the distinct identities of myriad interconnected 
people animated by a spirit of friendship with a common world. The “third dimension” of a 
common world endures only if its quasi-objective existence is publicly acknowledged by 
reaching out to it, and not merely to other persons, “with the gift of friendship.”74 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that current approaches to political friendship and to recognition are united by 
their lack of attention to the self-world-other triad. This is linked to their reliance on the 
dyadic intersubjective model of individuals as autonomous from the intermediary of 
phenomenal world. The deficit introduced by this model is that political friendship relations 
do not extend to the world in its own right. Yet where would political friendship be, without a 
world? I have therefore sought to provide an alternative description of political friendship 
that relies on a triadic relational ontology, which shifts the standard perspective from only 
interpersonal recognition and calls also for acknowledging the phenomenal world as a 
mutually conditioning third dimension of political coexistence. Put differently, political 
friendship in a complete sense also requires befriending the world, namely, cherishing the 
presence of world as “in-between” and giving it, together with others, the same unfailing 
interest, concern, goodwill, respect and care for its own sake as we would any friend worthy 
of the name. Bringing to the fore the place of world in political friendship reminds us that no 
one actually experiences publicly-oriented friendship alone and, crucially, without a common 
context—indeed, from a political perspective, people are dependent upon the mutuality of 
both interested others and an enduring world for aspects of their being. Political friendship is 
something that we do together through and upon the shared intermediary of a world, not 
something that we possess independent of it. Moreover, we are at least partly responsible for 
the status and well-being of others as well as of a viable world through bonds of 
acknowledgement within complex webs of interdependence. An integral element of 
befriending the world is to encourage people as political beings to look carefully at how we 
think about and esteem the world that will endure beyond our own finite lifespans, at who is 
responsible for ensuring its continuation and under what conditions, at mitigating its neglect 
and, most importantly, at not taking for granted that it will simply be there even if we do 
nothing to look after it. Because political friendship involves “sharing-the-world-with-
others,”75 it is manifested only where self, other and world can each reliably appear in their 
distinctive plurality. In many ways, then, befriending the world is a multifaceted expression 
of acknowledgement, gratitude and attentiveness towards the world as the grounding 
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 In this way befriending the world can be regarded as a variation on Arendt’s notion of 
“amor mundi” (love of the world), which she had originally considered as the title for her 
book published as The Human Condition; see the letter of 6 August 1955 in Hannah Arendt 
and Karl Jaspers, Correspondence, 1926-1969 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1992). It might 
also be seen as the kind of “partisanship for the world” for which Arendt praises Lessing; see 
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19-27. For an insightful discussion of Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction and its relation to 
typologies of enmity, see Gabriella Slomp, Carl Schmitt and the Politics of Hostility, 
Violence and Terror (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). If, as Slomp argues, 
Schmitt’s notion of friendship refers to “an existential bond between agents struggling to 
create their political identity” (118), then we might say that in an Arendtian vein it refers 
instead to the existential bond formed between those acting together to bring a common 
world into being. 
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